Cold war statement

I'd say, if you are a true professional, you show deference and respect for your opposite number.

Being the Russian Navy LtCdr (Ret), specialized in communication means through the entire career, I'd like to say that the system of the approving of the Soviet SSBN launch were so complicated that the SSBN crew had (and still has) little to do with the matter of affirmative launch: the main SSBN's comm feature, namely R-076 "Rotator", should be tuned to several HF and VLF radio channels through which the automatically generated command messages from shore controlling centers (manned eventually by Military General Staff officers, not Navy) were to be received just to unblock the main missile command unit. If there was no links or the command messages were failed to receive, the nuclear ballistic missile salvo was completely impossible. Generally, all that the SSBN crew should do is to receive the call to overall GQ, change the sub's depth to shallow level to be able to receive in HF radio band and satellite comms, link the main navigation unit to main missile unit to load the missiles' ballistic resolvers with sub's current position, and unlock the main missile unit by the CO's keys. If the command messages from shore are received successfully, it is the CO's decision to push the SALVO button, but at this moment from the left side of his shoulder is was compulsory to be for the KGB officer, whose job was to rule out any kind of disobeying the orders. The KGB officer, typically a LtCdr or Cdr, so-called "osobist", was usually former Navy officer from (for some reasons) Engineering community. He was NO the sub's crew appointed Deputy CO for Political Matters (usually a Cdr), who was the Navy officer and in this case beyond the authority. It was because the civilian Communists politics had little trust in their naval officers (no matter line, engineering or politics community) who were generally better educated than the Army officers and had more soft and liberal understanding of the circumstances. It is the view from beyond the surface. Speaking honestly, the main real problem for most of the Soviet Navy SSBN and SSN COs was to save the sub and especially crew during the patrol and return to the families. I'm far from opinion that in the case of war they all would disobey to fire missiles, but what I can tell to you with solid sureness is that all of them were completely aware that if they fire all their ballistics bazookas to the real targets on American land, they would lose all their families in the nuclear boils of the 3rd WW long before they returned to their bases . Russians may resemble the "bears", but "bears" can think and cry, too.
As for the air pilots, don't forget that oppositely to Navy command chain afloat, they all were and still are relatively young men (the average for Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers plane commanders is 25-26, for 1990), and they loved to play with mighty jets much more than to kill and be killed. I'd like to say that contrary to USN\USAF mindset contradiction, the Russian Naval Aviation is essentially (despite the uniform and formal authorities) just the maritime branch of VVS, from the point of view of common ethos. And this common "Russian Air-Minded ethos" contains both "I can do all except things that are forbidden" (more suitable to USN pilots) for the fighter and attack units, and "I will do directly that is allowed only" (the core of USAF ethos) for the longrange bomber, tanker and ASW units.
In Russia the Naval service was one of a couple of the ways to look at the entire world, so it was at least as valuable as to fight for homeland. The Air Force (VVS in Russian) service was one of a couple of ways to work with the fastest machines, is being simultaneously in much more loose military stupid discipline environment than in case of the Army, so it was as valuable as to fight for homeland. Given the fact that the main threat to Russia is usually coming by the land and the Army - tanks, grunts, tactical artillery and missiles - is the main source to defend and liberate the nation, traditionally - Army is the core. Thus, both the Naval and Air Force services during the Cold War were the communities for people (I mean primary the officers' corps for both) who has the brains and hearts to live, to possess the knowledges, to learn the life, to investigate and test the world and themselves, and so on - firstly. And the fact that they were, eventually, the military officers and were have to manage the violence and kill, was simply the payment for those possibilities for them as a human beings.
Were we wanting to play in "cat and the mouse" with our NATO counterparts by means of our mutual mighty battle machines? Of course yes - it's an amazing game. Were we wanting to fight the real battles, even from beyond visual range? Of course not. Never - it's bloody stupidity.
According to late Sam Huntington, a respectful American professor, professional military officers despite the country, nation and time are usually eager to maintain the safety and deter the enemies, real and supposed, from the war, but they are definitely reluctant to fight the real battles without real necessity. They know how expensive the war can be from any point of view. And the Soviet\Russian naval and AF officer corps was quite professional according to this Huntington's opinion.