Post by ghoststone on Jul 27, 2013 10:30:01 GMT -5
I do not believe that a few hours notice would have made much of a difference. Not because of the ability of the soldiers, sailors and airmen. But because of operational system in place to mobilized the units to action. Think about what happen later in the Philippines, well after the United States had been attacked and a "state of war" exisited.
News of the attack at Pearl Harbor arrived in the Philippines at 3 a.m. local time – 8 a.m. Hawaii time – but not to MacArthur or any other army officer. An army radio operator on watch heard of the attack while listening to a California radio station. He called his superior, who called another superior, and within a few minutes MacArthur was awakened by telephone. By 3:40 he was rushing to get dressed. At 5:30 he received a radio gram notifying him that the United States and Japan were at war.
The Japanese at their base in Formosa (Taiwan) were worried that an air strike from the Philippines would arrive in retaliation for the attack on Pearl Harbor, but no strike came. MacArthur believed that he was under explicit orders not to initiate hostilities against the Japanese and he denied General Brereton, at Clark Field (fifty miles northwest of Manila), permission to attack with his B-17s.
Arriving that morning from General Arnold was a command to avoid the mistake made at Pearl Harbor by dispersing aircraft on the ground. A report also arrived from a local radar station that unidentified aircraft were headed for Manila and Clark Field. General Brereton ordered thirty-six P-40 fighter planes into the air and seventeen of his B-17s to cruise out of harms way. The approaching Japanese planes changed course. The P-40 pilots could not find them and thought they had been sent up on a false alarm and returned to base, believing perhaps that the attack on Pearl Harbor had been a hoax and that they were being tested for readiness. The B-17s also returned to base.
Around noon the radar station sent another warning to Clark Field, by teletype, but the teletype operator was out to lunch. The radar station sent a message by radio, but the transmission was made unclear by static. A radar officer telephoned a lieutenant at the base, and the lieutenant promised to pass the word along "at the earliest opportunity." [note] A few minutes later a radio station being listened to during lunch announced "an unconfirmed report" that Clark Field was being bombed. The people who heard this news laughed. Then they began to hear a low moaning sound, which grew louder and louder. The Japanese were attacking with 181 Mitsubishi bombers and 84 Zero fighter-bombers. Base personnel had no air raid shelter or slit trenches to dive into. Only four planes managed to get off the ground. Most of the anti-aircraft rounds that ground crews managed to fire were old and exploded from two to four thousand feet short of the Japanese planes. The Japanese bombed and strafed Clark Field for a little more than an hour and then left, leaving the base in total ruin. Most of MacArthur's aircraft had been destroyed on the ground.
News of the attack at Pearl Harbor arrived in the Philippines at 3 a.m. local time – 8 a.m. Hawaii time – but not to MacArthur or any other army officer. An army radio operator on watch heard of the attack while listening to a California radio station. He called his superior, who called another superior, and within a few minutes MacArthur was awakened by telephone. By 3:40 he was rushing to get dressed. At 5:30 he received a radio gram notifying him that the United States and Japan were at war.
The Japanese at their base in Formosa (Taiwan) were worried that an air strike from the Philippines would arrive in retaliation for the attack on Pearl Harbor, but no strike came. MacArthur believed that he was under explicit orders not to initiate hostilities against the Japanese and he denied General Brereton, at Clark Field (fifty miles northwest of Manila), permission to attack with his B-17s.
Arriving that morning from General Arnold was a command to avoid the mistake made at Pearl Harbor by dispersing aircraft on the ground. A report also arrived from a local radar station that unidentified aircraft were headed for Manila and Clark Field. General Brereton ordered thirty-six P-40 fighter planes into the air and seventeen of his B-17s to cruise out of harms way. The approaching Japanese planes changed course. The P-40 pilots could not find them and thought they had been sent up on a false alarm and returned to base, believing perhaps that the attack on Pearl Harbor had been a hoax and that they were being tested for readiness. The B-17s also returned to base.
Around noon the radar station sent another warning to Clark Field, by teletype, but the teletype operator was out to lunch. The radar station sent a message by radio, but the transmission was made unclear by static. A radar officer telephoned a lieutenant at the base, and the lieutenant promised to pass the word along "at the earliest opportunity." [note] A few minutes later a radio station being listened to during lunch announced "an unconfirmed report" that Clark Field was being bombed. The people who heard this news laughed. Then they began to hear a low moaning sound, which grew louder and louder. The Japanese were attacking with 181 Mitsubishi bombers and 84 Zero fighter-bombers. Base personnel had no air raid shelter or slit trenches to dive into. Only four planes managed to get off the ground. Most of the anti-aircraft rounds that ground crews managed to fire were old and exploded from two to four thousand feet short of the Japanese planes. The Japanese bombed and strafed Clark Field for a little more than an hour and then left, leaving the base in total ruin. Most of MacArthur's aircraft had been destroyed on the ground.
