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Post by Jim Broshot on Nov 30, 2013 0:35:30 GMT -5
The Battleship was sadly a obsolete type by ww2 standards.
But the Gun Club was still running several navies, at least at the start of WW2.
As we all know the Carrier was the major deciding factor in ww2.
We know that now and most Admirals figured that out during the war, but the US built or proposed to build as many battleships as the Navy had in peacetime (15):
BB55 North Carolina, BB56 Washington; BB57 South Dakota, BB58 Indiana, BB59 Massachusetts, BB60 Alabama; BB61 Iowa, BB62 New Jersey, BB63 Missouri, BB64 Wisconsin, BB65 Illinois (cancelled 1945, 22% complete), BB66 Kentucky (construction suspended 1947 69.2% complete); BB67 Montana, BB68 Ohio, BB69 Maine, BB70 New Hampshire, BB71 Louisiana (the last five were never laid down, construction cancelled July 1943) - 16!
Look how many Royal Navy Battleships had been sunk during ww2 - five
Barham (1941 - submarine), Royal Oak (1939 - submarine), Repulse (1941 - air), Hood (1941 - surface action), Prince of Wales (1941 - air)
And five carriers as well (not counting escort carriers): Courageous (1939 - submarine), Glorious (1940 - surface action), Eagle (1942 - air), Hermes (1942 - air), Ark Royal (1942 - submarine)
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Nov 30, 2013 1:19:47 GMT -5
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Post by Nathan Milarta on Nov 30, 2013 18:15:28 GMT -5
The Battleship was sadly a obsolete type by ww2 standards.
But the Gun Club was still running several navies, at least at the start of WW2. As we all know the Carrier was the major deciding factor in ww2.
We know that now and most Admirals figured that out during the war, but the US built or proposed to build as many battleships as the Navy had in peacetime (15): BB55 North Carolina, BB56 Washington; BB57 South Dakota, BB58 Indiana, BB59 Massachusetts, BB60 Alabama; BB61 Iowa, BB62 New Jersey, BB63 Missouri, BB64 Wisconsin, BB65 Illinois (cancelled 1945, 22% complete), BB66 Kentucky (construction suspended 1947 69.2% complete); BB67 Montana, BB68 Ohio, BB69 Maine, BB70 New Hampshire, BB71 Louisiana (the last five were never laid down, construction cancelled July 1943) - 16! Look how many Royal Navy Battleships had been sunk during ww2 - five Barham (1941 - submarine), Royal Oak (1939 - submarine), Repulse (1941 - air), Hood (1941 - surface action), Prince of Wales (1941 - air) And five carriers as well (not counting escort carriers): Courageous (1939 - submarine), Glorious (1940 - surface action), Eagle (1942 - air), Hermes (1942 - air), Ark Royal (1942 - submarine) Hi Jim, Considering the firepower a Battleship can bring to a Navy, five is still too many "probably" to a Navy. The U.S. did not lose a single battleship after Dec 7th. |
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Post by Jim Broshot on Nov 30, 2013 20:58:15 GMT -5
Considering the firepower a Battleship can bring to a Navy, five is still too many "probably" to a Navy.
You will note that, except for Prince of Wales, all of the Royal Navy battleships lost were of WWI vintage.
Not listed were the older battleships that took significant damage which rendered them virtually useless except for shore bombardment:
Warspite after being hit by German FX1400 guided bomb in September 1943 off Salerno (and was later damaged by a mine off Normandy while engaged in shore bombardment)
Valiant - heavily damaged in August 1944 when the floating dock she was in collapsed
and most of the R class (Royal Sovereign, Ramilles, Revenge, Resolution) which had not been extensively modernized between the wars, were put into reserve before the war ended (Royal Sovereign was "loaned" to the USSR).
The U.S. did not lose a single battleship after Dec 7th.
Except for the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the USN was not sending its battleships continually in harms way as the Royal Navy was doing early in WW2
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garym
Propeller Driven
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Post by garym on Dec 1, 2013 9:52:57 GMT -5
Our three carriers were the #1 target. Keep in mind that PH was a Yamamoto project and he understood fully, that carriers were the new "battleships". It was the Brits sinking and damaging some Italian battleships in the harbor at Taranto, Italy in 1940 that gave the IJN the "idea" that major ships could be sunk in a shallow harbor using modified torpedoes. A harbor like Pearl Harbor with its 40 feet depths.
Perhaps they should have put 4-6-8 IJN subs outside of PH in late Nov so that in the event that the carriers departed, the subs could possiby shadow them and attack them on Dec 7th, or direct the IJN fleet to the US carriers after the attack on PH. Lots of hind-sight here of course.
On Dec 10th, Japanese aircraft made fast work of the HMS Prince of Wales and the HMS Repulse....... showing the glaring weakness of large ships going up against dive and torpedo planes. We again proved that at Midway.
But, absent the carriers, the next biggest target were the battleships so they drew the short straw on Dec 7th. Leaving the dry docks untouched PH was a big mistake as we have seen from the photos above.
With the overrun of the Phillipines in early 1942, this left PH as the ONLY main sub base in the Pacific, keeping in mind that Midway was merely a rest stop and re-fueling post for the subs. No major work was done there, but topping off the tanks there put them 1,000 miles closer to Japan for our subs in 1942-44.
The attack was obviously a success but I'd have to give them a "B-" overall. Look what happened just 6 months later!
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Post by yardbird78 on Dec 5, 2013 0:32:51 GMT -5
The US battleships did very little ship-to-ship fighting during WW-II, but they had that potential and the Japanese Admirals had to keep that in mind. The BBs were used mostly for floating AAA platforms and shore bombardment. I would guess that both sides didn't consider either role particularly important at the start of the war. At the time of the PH raid, the battleship was still considered more important than the carrier by both the US and Japan. The PH raid was the first major step in changing that relationship.
- It was very fortunate for the US that Nagumo did not launch a third wave attack and that the first two did not target the subs, POL storage and dry docks, but he certainly did have valid reasons for cancelling the 3rd wave.
- The Japanese lost about 10% of the attacking force on the 1st & 2nd waves. How many more would be lost on a 3rd attack that gave the US at least 3-4 hours of respite and time to prepare for the next round?
Darwin
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Post by Nathan Milarta on Dec 5, 2013 11:35:45 GMT -5
How many more would be lost on a 3rd attack that gave the US at least 3-4 hours of respite and time to prepare for the next round? Darwin I would think around 30 more. Considering the 29 lost during the 2 raids there should have been a substantial more lost on the third wave. U.S. P-40's and P-36's were ready, Navy ships were more manned and ready, AA ready. I still think the Japanese would finish their objectives. But there would be less planes returning to the carriers. Also it might have bought more time to search for the IJN ships and probable sent available aircraft to attack. U.S. planes had already taken off during attack and went out to search for the IJN. |
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Post by yardbird78 on Dec 5, 2013 19:03:42 GMT -5
If there had been a third wave, US could have at least followed them afterwards and determined in which general direction the IJN fleet was located. I am not sure what forces could be brought to bear in the chase, but it would have been interesting. I suspect that was one of the main reasons Admiral Nagumo vetoed the 3rd wave. He wanted to retire from the area without fighting a pitched battle with US air and sea forces.
Darwin
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Post by Steve Nelson on Dec 7, 2013 0:30:28 GMT -5
Of course, a lot of this is Monday Morning Quarterbacking. There was a lot the Japanese didn't know about our defenses (or lack thereof.) But it seems the basic underlying problem was their military philosophy, seeing warships as the most "honorable" targets, and everything else as secondary if not irrelevant. I've read that Japanese subs tended to avoid merchant shipping in favor of warships. Sinking an unarmed merchant ship was regarded as "beneath" them. Certainly, if they'd completely ignored the battlewagons and other ships at PH and concentrated on maintenance, fuel and supply facilities they would have done far more long-term damage..but I don't think the Japanese military brass were simply trained to think that way. Considering that they had only recently become an industrial/technological power, and most of their neighbors were still largely poor, feudal, agrarian cultures or far-flung colonies of European countries, they really didn't know how to fight the might of a wealthy, fully-industrialized nation like the United States. Like the old saying goes: the generals in today's war are always re-fighting the last one.
SN
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Post by Nathan Milarta on Dec 7, 2013 12:52:54 GMT -5
Great insight, Steve!
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garym
Propeller Driven
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Post by garym on Dec 9, 2013 21:35:42 GMT -5
But from a tactical standpoint, losing another 30+ aircraft weighted against blowing up the huge fuel farm, the dry docks and the sub base on a third attack is a no-brainer. Accomplishing these would have set us back an additional 6-12 months........
The RAF lost about 40% of the attacking Lancasters from 617 Squadron attacking the Ruhr Valley dams in 1943.....
The Doolittle Raid lost 100% of the attacking aircraft but that mission was still deemed a huge success!
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Post by Steve Nelson on Dec 10, 2013 5:41:38 GMT -5
To be fair, the losses on those Allied raids were negligible in the overall scheme of things, and easilly replaced. One of the problems that always plagued the Japanese was that they didn't have the industrial capacity or training programs to make up losses of aircraft and experienced crews (as well as ships.) Certainly, they should have launched the third wave, or simply concentrated more on drydocks, fuel and maintenance facilities from the get-go, but Nagumo erred on the side of caution and it came back to bite the IJN. But he may have been extra cautious because he knew that aircraft, pilots, and especially the carriers could not be easilly replaced if lost.
Overall, I think Japan's biggest mistake was starting a war with us in the first place. Even though he likely never actually said it, the famous "sleeping giant" quote attributed to Yamamoto is absolutely correct. Japan was well aware there was no way they could win an all-out war with America, and never intended to invade or attack the continental US in force. They were hoping to kick us out of the Pacific, and gambling that we wouldn't have the desire to expend the blood and treasure necessary to retake it, and negotiate a settlement that would still leave them with some territorial gains. American propaganda made much of the "sneak attack" angle to whip up the public, but I think that even if Japan had presented thier ultimatum/war declaration just befor the attack (as originally planned) the end result would have been the same.
I can't help but wonder how things would have gone had Japan avoided Hawaii entirely, and concentrated on the Philippines and other US possessions in the South Pacific. Would the American public have supported an all-out war to retake some far-flung islands full of "brown people?" Remember, there was a sizable isolationist sentiment in America at the time, and our treatment of the Filipinos during the Spanish-American war just a few decades earlier was pretty shameful. However whether it had been a "sneak attack" or not, once the Japanese directly attacked a US Territory the die was cast.
SN
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garym
Propeller Driven
Posts: 144
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Post by garym on Dec 10, 2013 19:05:18 GMT -5
Very good points Steve...... thanks for adding them. Besides losing the 4 carriers at Midway, they also lost ALL of those planes and all of those pilots. A Triple-Whammy on them. That definetely was the turning point in the war. I think that had they "only" attacked the Phillipnes, the US would have lost a LOT of troops, etc as they did do but I think that woud have been enough to get Congress to Declare war. I don't think that it's a "secret" tat FDR was itching to get in to the war to support his friend Churchil. Also, just a few days after PH, Hitler (stupidly) declared war on the US, so we'd have been in it anyway...... even without PH. They were depending on a fatal kill-shot at PH and they did not get it. Even had they sunk all three carriers on Dec 7th, the outcome would have been the same by 1945/46. For you guys who enjoy WW 2 fiction, I had a hard time putting this book down year ago! en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_(1995_novel) |
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Post by Grant Goodale on Feb 10, 2014 19:07:19 GMT -5
The IJN did not loose all of the pilots at Midway. Most of them were saved. Read "Shattered Sword". The real big losses were the aircraft maintenance crews.
An interesting "what if" would have the Japanese striking south but ignoring US possessions completely. I do not think many Americans would be too distraught if the Phillipines were lost.
FWIW
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Post by Steve Nelson on Feb 10, 2014 19:49:32 GMT -5
"The IJN did not loose all of the pilots at Midway. Most of them were saved. Read "Shattered Sword". The real big losses were the aircraft maintenance crews."
Which sort of brings us back to the argument that attacking the drydocks and maintenance facilities at PH would have been a better strategic move in the long run. As your statement implies, pilots and airplanes are just the "tip of the spear." They're useless without maintenance crews and facilities, not to mention servicable airstrips and fuel. I've always read that the real advantage the US had in WWII was our talent for logistics and building support infrastructures. Germany and Japan both relied on a "Blitzkrieg" type strategy, with a fast, hard hitting advance, but not much defense in depth. The Germans lost in Russia because they outran their supply lines, and similarly I've read that once Japanese forces occupied a territory, they were expected to largely fend for themselves when it came to food and other basic necessities.
I also agree that had the Japanese struck south, avoiding Hawaii and stopping short of Australia, the US would have made some noise and rattled some sabres, but probably wouldn't have gotten into a shooting war. It would have also made the European situation interesting, as we didn't get directly involved in the fighting there until Hitler declared war on us, in the wake of the attack on PH. If he hadn't, might we have simply continued as the "Arsenal of Democracy" but stayed out of the actual fighting? As you say, the "what ifs" are interesting to contemplate.
SN
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